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Abstract 
We investigate (a) how patient choice of hospital for elective hip replacement is influenced by 
distance, quality and waiting times, (b) differences in choices between patients in urban and rural 
locations, (c) ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?elasticities of demand to quality and the number of 
local rivals, and how these changed after relaxation of constraints on hospital choice in England in 
2006.  Using a data set on over 500,000 elective hip replacement patients over the period 2002/3 to 
2012/13 we find that patients became more likely to travel to a provider with higher quality or lower 
waiting times, the proportion of patients bypassing their nearest provider increased from 25% to 
almost 50%, and hospital elasticity of demand with respect to own quality increased.  By 2012/13 
average hospital demand elasticity with respect to readmission rates and waiting times were 0.2 
and 0.04.  Providers facing more rivals had demand that was more elastic with respect to quality 
and waiting times.  Patients from rural areas have smaller disutility from distance. 
 
Keywords: hospital, choice, quality, waiting times, distance, rurality. 
 
JEL: I11, I18, L15, R22. 
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1. Introduction 
,ĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞƌĞĨŽƌŵƐĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞa provider for hospital care have been 
introduced in several OECD countries during the last two decades (Vrangbaek et al, 2012).  Reducing 
constraints on choice for planned (non-emergency) healthcare is intended, inter alia, to incentivize 
hospitals to compete on quality (Besley and Ghatak, 2003), especially in those systems where prices 
for healthcare are regulated (Gaynor, 2006).  It is hoped that with fewer constraints on patient 
choice of provider, hospitals with higher quality can attract more demand and raise revenues, 
whereas those with poor quality may lose revenues.  However, the success of this incentive 
mechanism depends crucially on whether patients and demand respond to hospital quality. 
 
In the English National Health Service (NHS) before 2006 the choice of hospitals for elective hospital 
treatment was generally constrained to the set of local NHS hospitals which had contracts with the 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐůŽĐĂůŚĞĂůƚŚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ.  In 2006 constraints on choice of provider were relaxed with patients 
having to be offered a choice of at least 4 providers and from 2008 they could choose from any 
qualified providers wherever located. 
 
Using data from 2002/3 to 2012/13 on choice of hospital for elective hip replacement we address 
three research questions related to understanding demand-side mechanisms in healthcare: (a) how 
do distance, quality and waiting times influence choice of hospital, (b) do these factors have 
different effects on the choices of patients in rural and urban areas, and (c) ŚŽǁĚŽĞƐĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?Ɛ
elasticity of demand with respect to its quality vary with the number of rivals.  We make use of our 
long run of data on choices to investigate how the answers to these questions changed over time, 
especially after the relaxation of constraints on hospital choice in 2006. 
 
These questions have obvious policy relevance.  If hospital demand is not responsive to quality then 
relaxation of constraints on choice is unlikely to stimulate hospital competition via quality.  Wider 
choice sets may contain providers who yield higher utility to patients.  But this benefit may be 
greater in urban areas where patients will have more local providers, whereas rural patients with 
longer distances to travel to providers may gain less and may change their demands less in response 
to quality.  If demand is more responsive to quality for hospital with more rivals, quality may be 
higher in more competitive areas and lower in less competitive ones. 
 
We estimate models of hospital choice for elective hip replacement and focus on two dimensions of 
quality: procedure specific clinical quality and waiting times.  The most common adverse outcome 
after hip replacement surgery is an emergency readmission within 28 days.  In addition to 
emergency readmission rates, we also measure clinical quality by rates of revisions within a year of 
discharge, and mortality rates within 28 days of discharge. 
 
We find that patients value quality when choosing their preferred provider of care, especially after 
relaxation of constraints on choice.  Specifically, we find that hospitals with higher readmission rates 
were less likely to be chosen in the years after 2006, while this was not the case in earlier years.  
Revision rates did not have a consistent effect on choice.  Hospitals with long waiting times attracted 
fewer patients, but only after 2008, while hospitals with higher mortality rates were less likely to be 
chosen throughout the entire period.  As with previous studies, we find distance to be a strong 
predictor of choice, with patients preferring hospitals close from home. 
 
Marginal utilities for quality are similar for urban and rural patients from 2006 onwards.  Marginal 
disutility of distance did not change much over the period but was smaller for rural patients. 
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After the introduction of choice policies, the average demand elasticity to readmission rates varied 
between -0.07 and -0.25.  The average demand elasticity to waiting times was about 0.04 after 
2007.  Patients are willing to travel 0.5 additional kilometres to avoid an increase of one standard 
deviation in emergency readmissions.  Hospital demand is more elastic with respect to own quality 
the larger the number of rivals, and the effect of having more rivals became greater in later years. 
 
Section 2 provides background by way of a short review of the relevant literature and a description 
of the institutional framework.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 sets out the methods and 
Section 5 has the results.  Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Related literature 
Our study contributes to the small but growing literature on hospital choice and how it relates to 
quality (see Brekke et al. (2014) for a review).  Three recent studies are from England.  Gaynor et al 
(2012) investigates the introduction of choice policies in England for patients in need of a coronary 
artery bypass graft (CABG) using data for 15 months before (January 2004 to March 2005) and 15 
months after (January 2007 to March 2008).  They find that patients are responsive to quality, and 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůĐŚŽŝĐĞůĞĚƚŽĂƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
welfare.  The market for hip replacement is very different from that for CABG.  The number of hip 
replacements has increased over time whereas CABG demand has fallen.
1
  The market for hip 
replacement is less concentrated: CABG surgery is highly specialised and provided by only 30 
hospitals.  Hip replacements are performed in most hospitals in England and the market has grown 
substantially over time from 187 providers in 2002/3 to 297 in 2012/13 as a result of the entry of 
private providers.  The mortality risks of the two procedures also differ: 30-day mortality after non-
emergency CABG is 1.17%, compared with non-emergency hip replacement mortality of 0.35%. 
 
Beckert et al (2012) use English data for elective hip replacement for 2009/10 and measure hospital 
quality by overall hospital mortality, MRSA infection rates, hip replacement waiting times and 
numbers of doctors and nurses.  In keeping with the broader literature on hospital choice, they find 
that patients are responsive to quality. By contrast we use condition specific clinical quality 
measures (post-operative emergency readmissions, revision rates, and mortality rates).  Moreover, 
we investigate how demand responsiveness has changed over a ten-year period before and after 
relaxation of constraints on choice. 
 
Gutacker et al (2015) analyse choice of provider for elective hip replacement surgery in the English 
NHS between 2009 and 2013 making use of newly available data on patient reported outcomes 
(PROMs) and find that using PROMs in addition to conventional quality measures such as revision 
and readmission rates improves predictions of hospital choice.  Since PROMs data are only available 
from April 2009, we use the conventional measures to examine choices before and after relaxation 
of constraints on choice. 
 
The literature on rural and urban hospitals is mainly US focused and has mostly investigated 
differences in quality of urban/rural hospitals (Adams et al, 1991; Goody, 1993; Ferrier and 
Valdmanis, 1996; Baldwin et al, 2004).  Differences in choice of healthcare provider and targeting of 
rural patients have been investigated by Tai et al (2004) and Roh et al (2008).  These studies focus on 
ƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĂŐĞ ?ĐŽŵŽƌďŝĚŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƉĂƐƚmedical utilisation) and 
organization characteristics (e.g. volume, type of hospitals, number of beds, ownership status) on 
demand for rural hospitals.  Conversely, we focus on differences in choices (and preferences) 
between urban and rural patients. 
 
2.2 Institutional background 
The England NHS is funded by taxation and free to patients at point of use.  Local purchasing bodies 
receive budgets from the Department of Health to contract healthcare provision for their resident 
populations from primary care and hospital providers.
2
  As part of the re-introduction of the internal 
market (Dixon et al, 2010), prospective payment for hospitals was rolled out incrementally from 
April 2003 onwards, so that increasingly money followed the patient (Farrar et al, 2009).  Previously, 
                                                 
1
 Hip replacements increased by 30% over our period compared with a reduction of 20% in CABG. 
2
 The English local purchasing authorities are Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) until April 2013, after which they have been 
replaced by Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). 
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health authorities negotiated block contracts with their local providers under which the provider 
agreed to treat fixed number of patients in return for a fixed sum, with some adjustment to the 
payment if the number treated differed from the contracted number.  Choice was not entirely 
constrained. In principle, GPs could refer patients to other providers who would then be 
remunerated per patient, but this was not encouraged by health authorities.  In 2002/3 the average 
practice referred patients to over 7 different providers over all types of elective care (Dusheiko et al, 
2008).  Private independent sector providers (ISPs) were allowed to enter the NHS market for 
planned care from 2003 onwards; until then only public NHS hospitals could provide inpatient care.
3
 
 
In 2006, patients were given the right to choose from at least 4 providers of non-emergency care; 
and from 2008 they could choose any qualified provider wherever located.  An electronic booking 
system (Choose and Book) was introduced in 2005/6 to allow direct booking of referrals from 
general practices.  By 2012/13, 50% of all referrals were made via the system (Dusheiko and 
Gravelle, 2015).  Since 2007 the NHS Choices website has provided public information on the 
location, services and quality of providers. 
  
                                                 
3
 By 2010/11, private providers treated 4% of NHS elective patients, concentrating on a small number of high volume 
procedures such as hip replacements (Hawkes, 2012). 
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3. Data 
We use individual level data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) on all elective admissions for NHS-
funded elective primary (i.e. non-revision) hip replacement surgery between April 2002 and March 
2013 in English NHS and privately-operated hospitals for patients aged 18 and over.
4
  We exclude 
privately-funded patients treated in NHS hospitals (13,087, or 2.21% of the HES initial sample).  We 
drop hospitals with less than 50 elective hip replacement patients in a given year to reduce noise in 
our quality measures.  The average hospital volume in our estimation sample is 307 patients. 
 
PatientƐ ? usual place of residence is reported at Lower Super Output Area (LSOA).5  Each LSOA 
contains approximately 1,500 inhabitants and is designed to be homogeneous with respect to tenure 
and accommodation type.  We use ONS definitions of urban and rural LSOAs to attach an indicator of 
rurality to patients.
6
  We also attach a measure of income deprivation to each patient by their LSOA 
using the 2004 Indices of Multiple Deprivation. 
 
We compute straight-line distances using geographical coordinates of ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌŽŝĚŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?>^K
of residence and the locations of all hospitals providing hip replacement surgery in a given year.
7
  
The choice set for each patient is defined ĂƐƚŚĞ ? ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐĐůŽƐĞƐƚƚŽƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌŽŝĚŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
LSOA of residence.  We exclude 5,589 NHS-funded patients (0.96%) who choose a provider outside 
this choice set. 
 
We measure hospital quality with three clinical indicators specific to elective hip replacement 
patients:  28-day emergency readmissions following discharge; one-year revisions rates following 
surgery; and mortality rates within 28 days of discharge.  All rates are adjusted for case-mix 
differences using the approach prescribed by the Health & Social Care Information Centre (2013a). 
Emergency readmissions rates are associated with lower quality of care (Weissman et al, 1999) and 
are commonly used as a measure of quality, both internationally (B et al, 2007;  Balla et al, 2008) and 
in England (Billings et al, 2012; Blunt et al, 2014). 
 
Waiting times are likely to ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?sĂƌŬĞǀŝƐƐĞƌĞƚĂů ?2007; Sivey, 2012; 
'ĂǇŶŽƌĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ?ZƵǁĂĂƌĚĂŶĚŽƵǀĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇƉŽƐƚƉŽŶĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐĂŶĚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚ
status may deteriorate while waiting (Appleby et al., 2005, Oudhoff et al., 2007).  We therefore also 
measure mean waiting time for hip replacement at a provider as the average time elapsed from the 
date the specialist adds a patient to the waiting list to the date of hospital admission for surgery. 
 
We distinguish between NHS and independent sector (ie private) providers (ISPs) and also group 
NHS providers into five categories used by the National Patient Safety Agency: NHS small and multi-
service, medium, large non-teaching trust, NHS teaching trust, and NHS specialised orthopaedic 
provider.  This allows for the possibility that choice of provider may be influenced by unobservable 
characteristics associated with provider type.
8
 
                                                 
4
 We exclude patients undergoing a revision surgery because these patients are expected to be more likely to return to the hospital of 
initial hip replacement surgery, independently of observed hospital quality.  We use the hip replacement procedure codes from 
Department of Health (2008). 
5
 As our sample span from 2002 to early 2013, we use LSOA defined according to 2001 census boundaries by the English Office for National 
Statistics (ONS).  There were 32,482 LSOA in England according to this definition. 
6
 The rural category encompasses the grouping of areas classified as town and fringe, village, hamlet and isolated dwellings, while the 
urban category consist just of urban areas.  See ONS (2004) for details. 
7
 Hospital location is based on the postcode of the headquarters of NHS trusts and the postcode of the hospital site for independent sector 
providers (ISPs).  We use NHS hospital headquarters instead of the hospital site since: NHS produced quality information is defined and 
measured at trust level,  NHS sites belonging to a same trust are typically clustered together and over 91% of elective hip replacement 
operations in NHS providers are performed in a single site.  Private providers are often part of hospital chains which have more 
geographically scattered sites, so that LSOA to site distance is more appropriate for private providers. 
8
 Note that the size classification of NHS providers is not affected by the number of hip replacement patients as it is based on the total 
number of all patients (emergency and elective) and availability of services, and does not vary over time. 
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4. Methods 
4.1 Model specification 
The empirical analysis is based on the conditional logit random utility model (McFadden, 1974).  
Utility of patient 1,...,i N  receiving care at provider 1,...,j J at time 1,...,t T  is 
 
      ijt ijt jt ijtU V [ H           (1) 
 
where ijtV  depends on observed hospital characteristics, such as quality, and travel distance, jt[ is 
utility from unobserved hospital characteristics and ijtH is the unobserved random error term.  Each 
patient i  has a choice set itM J .  If the error term ijtH is distributed as an i.i.d. extreme value, the 
probability of patient i  choosing hospital j , given that they have decided to have a hip replacement 
in the NHS, is 
 
     1' '
'
exp   exp   
it
ijt ijt jt ij t j t
j M
P V V[ [


ª º  « »¬ ¼¦       (2) 
 
The estimated coefficients in a conditional logit model are identified only up to a common scale 
parameter that depends on the unobserved variance of the random error term ijtH  (Train, 2003).  To 
be able to compare marginal utilities of quality and distance across different years, we estimate a 
pooled model for all patients across all years interacting observable hospital characteristics and 
distance with year dummies. 
 
We assume that utility of patient i in year t who chooses hospital j of type g is 
 
K K S K N M Sq q s qx d x s
ijt kt gkt kt jkt st ijt kmt jkt imt s ijt imt ijtk k s k i m sU q q d q x d xD E G E G H     ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦  
           = ( ) ( )q q d qx dxgt t jt t t t jt it t t it t ijtHc c c      q Į T ȕ G ȕ T [ ȕ G [ ȕ     (3) 
 
where   is the Kronecker product. 
 
jktq  is the kth quality measure (emergency readmissions, revisions, mortality, waiting times) in 
provider j in year t. gktq = /
gtN
jkt gtj g q N¦  is the mean of the kth quality characteristic in hospitals of 
type g in year t.
9
  We include gktq in the specification to allow for the unobserved provider effects 
jt[ .10 
 
s
ijtd  is the s ?ƚŚƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞdijt from the centroid of the LSOA of residence of patient i to 
provider j in year t.  We found that a cubic distance specification had better fit than linear or 
quadratic specifications but adding further powers of distance did not yield further improvements.  
                                                 
9
 There are six hospital types: private, large NHS, medium NHS, small/multiservice NHS, teaching NHS, specialist NHS, with 
the reference category being large (non-teaching) NHS hospitals. 
10
 We also considered richer specifications with interactions of provider type with year dummies to allow the effect of 
hospital type to vary over time.  However it was not possible to compute coefficients or standard errors for these 
interaction terms. 
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mx = 
1
imtt i
N x ¦ ¦  is the average the m͛th individual characteristic (the mean for age, measures 
of severity and deprivation and the mode for gender) over all patients in all years and imtx  = imtx  
mx .  We thus allow for patient characteristics to affect the marginal utility of provider quality and 
distance.  By interacting the deviations of patient characteristics from their averages we can 
interpret the coefficients 
q
ktE , dstE  as the marginal utilities with respect to quality and powers of 
distance of a reference patient with average characteristics in a given year. 
 
Information on hospital quality indicators is typically available to patients with a time lag of 
approximately one year, so patients are assumed to respond to past rather than current information 
on quality when choosing providers.  For this reason, provider qualities qjkt and provider type 
qualities gktq  (emergency readmissions, revisions, mortality, and waiting times) are measured with a 
one-year lag.
11
  
 
To investigate differences in preferences between urban and rural patients and how these have 
evolved over time we also estimate a model assuming that 
 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q d qx dx qR dRijt gt t jt t t t jt it t t it t jt ijt t t ijt t ijtU R R Hc c c c c         q Į T ȕ G ȕ T [ ȕ G [ ȕ T ȕ G ȕ  (4) 
 
where iR  is an indicator function equal to 1 when the patient resides in an LSOA classified as rural.  
Thus the marginal utilities of quality and distance for rural patients with reference personal 
characteristics are 
q qR
kt ktE E  and d dRst stE E . 
 
4.2 Willingness to travel and demand elasticity 
Since the utility function (1) is unique only up to a linear transformation, estimated coefficients 
convey information only about the sign of marginal utility and of the effect of quality on demand.  
However, the ratio of estimated marginal utilities (i.e. the negative of the marginal rate of 
substitution) is unaffected by linear transformations and hence provides quantitative information 
about patient preferences which is comparable across different years and different types of patient. 
 
From (3) willingness to travel (WTT) of the representative patient in year t for a one standard 
deviation increase in the k ?ƚŚquality measure (Vk) is 
 
 2
1 2 3
/
/ 2 3
ijt
q
ijt ijt jkt kt
kt k k k d d d
jkt ijt ijt t t d t dU
d U q
WTT
q U d
EV V V E E P E P
§ ·w w w     ¨ ¸¨ ¸w w w  © ¹
    (5) 
 
where dP is the average distance to the chosen provider for all patients over all years.  The delta 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŝƐƵƐĞĚƚŽĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƚŚĞtddƐ ?Ɛtandard errors (Hole, 2007).  ktWTT  is the change in distance 
to the chosen hospital that the average patient in year t requires to offset a one standard deviation 
increase in qjkt. 
                                                 
11
 This approach is similar to Varkevisser et al (2012), Beukers et al (2014) and Gutacker et al (2015).  Hospitals may learn 
by doing so that higher volume providers have higher quality (Luft et al, 1987; Gaynor et al, 2005).  A study with English 
1997-2002 hip replacement data found that 30-day in-hospital mortality was higher in low volume hospitals that treated 
less than 100 patients per year but found no volume effect above this threshold (Judge et al, 2006).  A more recent study 
(Varagunam, 2015) using better data on quality reported no relationship between hospital volume and quality.  Using 
lagged quality data further reduces the risk of simultaneity bias. 
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Note that in the usual consumer setting, where utility depends on goods with positive marginal 
utility, the marginal rate of substitution between two goods is negative: it is the amount of one good 
the individual would be willing to give up in exchange for one unit of another good.  If the quality 
measures had positive marginal utility and distance has negative marginal utility then WTT would be 
positive: it would be the extra distance the patient would be willing to travel to a hospital with 
higher quality.  But if, as seems plausible, the quality measures qjkt (emergency readmission rates, 
revision rates, mortality rates, waiting times) and distance have negative marginal utility, then WTT 
would be negative.  It would be the reduction in distance to a provider required to offset the 
increase in qjkt. 
 
We also compute provider elasticity of demand with respect to qjkt and the percentage demand 
change from a one standard deviation increase in own quality.  Expected demand at provider j  is  
jtjt ijti C
Y P ¦  where Cjt is the set of patients whose choice sets include provider j  (j  Mit).  
Following Santos et al (2015), the elasticity of demand of provider j to its quality qjkt is  
 
 1jt
jt
jt
Y jt jkt jktq
jkt kt ijt ijti C
jkt jt ijti C
Y q q
E P P
q Y P
E

w  w ¦ ¦      (6) 
We report the mean of (6) weighted by predicted provider demand jtY . 
 
The percentage change in hospital demand for a kV increase in qkt (semi-elasticity) is  
  1% 100 100 1
jt jtjkt k
jtk qk
jt kt ijt ijt k ijti C i Cq
jkt jt
Y
Y P P P
q YV
V E V  '  
w ª º ª º'  u  u « » « »¬ ¼ ¬ ¼w ¦ ¦                        (7) 
We investigate the relationship between semi-elasticities and market structure by plotting the 
estimates of % kjtY'  against the number of rival providers within a radius of 30 km. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 has summary statistics on patient characteristics and their hospital choices.  Patients are 
elderly (average age 68) and 60% are female. Around 1/8
th
 have had an emergency admission in the 
year before their hip replacement and nearly a third suffer from comorbidities when admitted.   Just 
over a quarter live in rural LSOAs. 
 
On average patients can choose from over 7 hospitals within 30km and over 15 within 50km. The 
average distance to their chosen hospital was 13km.  Two thirds chose their nearest hospital but one 
third did not, travelling an additional 3.5km to their chosen hospital.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 2002/3 ʹ 2012/13 
Patient characteristics Mean SD Min Max 
Age 67.95 11.36 18 103 
Male  0.40 0.49 0 1 
Emergency admissions in year prior to admission 0.13 0.56 0 211 
Number of Elixhauser comorbitidies  0.32 0.8 0 13 
IMD income 2004 (score) 0.13 0.1 0 0.96 
Resident in urban LSOA 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Availability of hospitals     
Average number of hospitals within 10km 1.37 1.75 0 15 
Average number of hospitals within 30km 7.35 7.23 0 33 
Average number of hospitals within 50km 15.55 11.85 0 51 
Choice of hospital     
Distance to chosen hospital (km) 13.37 13.51 0 292.36 
Proportion of patients bypassing closest hospital 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Excess distance travelled over closest hospital 3.54 9.41 0 266.04 
Proportion of patients treated in private hospitals 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Notes.  Number of observations is 546,474. 
 
Figure 1 shows the marked changes in clinical quality and waiting times over the period.  Note that, 
as we assume that patients observed quality and waiting time with a one year lag, we show the 
lagged values against the years for which they are relevant. For example, we plot 2001/2 
readmissions against 2002/3 which is the year in which choices influenced by 2001/2 readmission 
rates were made.  Lagged emergency readmission rates increased between 2002/3 and 2007/8 and 
then declined.  Lagged revision rates fell from 2006/7 onwards and had halved by 2012/13.  Lagged 
mortality after hip replacement declined over the period.   There was a large decrease in waiting 
times over the period from nearly 9 months to under 3 months. 
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Figure 1. Trends in one year lagged clinical quality and waiting times 2002/3 to 2012/13 
 
Note.  We plot one-year lagged values against years. For example the lagged readmission rate plotted against 2002/3 is the 
readmission rate for 2001/2 as we assume that choices in year t are based on quality and waiting times in year t1. 
 
Figure 2 shows the increasing numbers of patients treated over the period.  The total number 
increased by 65.5% with a larger increase (83.8%) for rural than for urban (59.5%).  There was a 
substantial increase in the number of NHS hip replacement patients treated in private hospitals from 
zero in 2002/3 to over 20% in 2012/13. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Trends in patients treated by urbanicity and hospital ownership 
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Figure 3 plots the trends in choices made by patients.  In panel (a) we see that the rural patients 
travelled about twice as far to their chosen provider as urban patients. Despite the increase in the 
number of providers, due to the entry of private sector ISPs, the average distance to the chosen 
provider was constant over the period.  Panel (b) shows that rural patients were more likely to 
bypass their nearest provider than urban patients.  The proportion of both rural and urban patients 
bypassing their nearest provider increased steadily and by 20012/13 was 55% for rural patients and 
45% for urban patients.   Panels (c) and (d) show how the proportion of patients choosing their n
th
 
closest provider has changed between 2002/3 and 2012/13.   
 
 
Figure 3.  Distance and choice of provider 2002/3 to 2012/13 
 
5.2 Estimation results 
Table 2 gives selected coefficients from models which include a cubic function of distance and 
patient characteristics interacted with distance.  Model 1 only has distance and patient 
characteristics interacted with distance.  Model 2 is specification (3) which adds quality variables and 
patient characteristics interacted with quality to model 1. Model 3 is specification (4) which adds 
further interactions with patient rurality.  Although most of the explanatory power is due to 
distance, the pseudo R
2
 increases as quality and waiting time are added to the model and there are 
considerable improvements in the two information criteria goodness of fit measures.  
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Table 2. Estimates of marginal utilities  
  (1) distance  (2) distance & 
quality 
(3) distance, quality, rurality 
          urban patients rural interactions 
  Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
distance (baseline) -0.351 -92.048 -0.3675 -92.144 -
0.3842 
-94.01 0.088 14.19 
2003 * distance 0.0697 15.718 0.0786 17.005 0.0755 15.522 -0.0229 -3.149 
2004 * distance 0.0256 5.084 0.0279 5.298 0.0334 6.164 -0.02 -2.524 
2005 * distance 0.0307 6.416 0.0365 7.33 0.0097 1.762 0.0487 6 
2006 * distance 0.0232 4.712 0.0339 6.671 0.0419 8.109 -0.0204 -2.743 
2007 * distance 0.0417 8.467 0.0467 9.091 0.0428 7.957 0.0115 1.387 
2008 * distance 0.0641 13.617 0.0714 14.617 0.0668 12.819 -0.0012 -0.152 
2009 * distance 0.0609 12.886 0.0694 14.148 0.0681 13.484 -0.0162 -2.185 
2010 * distance 0.0688 14.708 0.0771 15.842 0.0697 13.594 0.0036 0.46 
2011 * distance 0.0742 16.31 0.0841 17.79 0.0729 14.318 0.0045 0.592 
2012 * distance 0.0706 15.453 0.0806 16.943 0.0775 15.432 -0.0103 -1.343 
readmissions 
(baseline) 
    0.0502 10.487 0.0468 8.849 0.0127 1.498 
2003 * readmissions     -0.063 -8.968 -
0.0831 
-
10.677 
0.0655 5.267 
2004 * readmissions     -0.0425 -5.852 -
0.0502 
-6.226 0.0115 0.91 
2005 * readmissions     -0.0519 -8.103 -
0.0453 
-6.396 -0.0217 -1.879 
2006 * readmissions     -0.0363 -5.472 -
0.0328 
-4.45 -0.0173 -1.482 
2007 * readmissions     -0.0962 -15.237 -
0.1137 
-16.16 0.056 5.047 
2008 * readmissions     -0.0709 -11.731 -
0.0705 
-
10.471 
-0.0042 -0.388 
2009 * readmissions     -0.0761 -12.154 -
0.0868 
-
12.473 
0.0296 2.686 
2010 * readmissions     -0.125 -19.998 -
0.1211 
-
17.443 
-0.0196 -1.765 
2011 * readmissions     -0.1185 -19.507 -
0.1316 
-
19.436 
0.0403 3.78 
2012 * readmissions     -0.107 -17.742 -
0.1089 
-
16.258 
0.0046 0.438 
waiting times 
(baseline) 
    0.0014 0.266 -
0.0112 
-1.943 0.0592 6.278 
2003 * waiting times     -0.0145 -2.027 -
0.0153 
-1.983 0.0019 0.148 
2004 * waiting times     -0.0086 -1.027 -
0.0143 
-1.586 0.0183 1.201 
2005 * waiting times     0.0626 6.595 0.0564 5.424 0.0222 1.327 
2006 * waiting times     0.1172 10.837 0.1152 9.683 0.0057 0.302 
2007 * waiting times     0.0632 5.411 0.0572 4.348 0.0131 0.658 
2008 * waiting times     -0.046 -4.757 -
0.0369 
-3.364 -0.0462 -2.841 
2009 * waiting times     -0.0177 -1.341 -
0.0234 
-1.56 0.0079 0.359 
2010 * waiting times     0.002 0.206 0.0284 2.63 -0.1058 -6.384 
2011 * waiting times     -0.0522 -4.013 -
0.0319 
-2.214 -0.0842 -3.692 
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2012 * waiting times     -0.0239 -2.122 -
0.0105 
-0.84 -0.0567 -2.857 
revisions  (baseline)     -0.0817 -6.628 -
0.0797 
-6.021 -0.043 -1.877 
2003 * revisions     0.1732 10.776 0.155 8.929 0.0825 2.735 
2004 * revisions     0.0143 0.964 -
0.0196 
-1.226 0.186 6.627 
2005 * revisions     0.0707 4.704 0.0514 3.142 0.1113 4.002 
2006 * revisions     0.084 5.624 0.0581 3.604 0.1288 4.556 
2007 * revisions     0.1288 7.825 0.117 6.523 0.0837 2.795 
2008 * revisions     0.0233 1.485 -0.007 -0.411 0.1311 4.55 
2009 * revisions     0.0544 3.156 -
0.0041 
-0.215 0.2373 7.556 
2010 * revisions     0.027 1.55 0.0002 0.01 0.1498 4.66 
2011 * revisions     0.1412 9.065 0.1389 8.166 0.0508 1.791 
2012 * revisions     0.0982 6.178 0.0802 4.618 0.1004 3.478 
mortality (baseline)     -0.1335 -5.186 -
0.1096 
-3.912 -0.1079 -2.311 
2003 * deaths     0.02 0.593 0.0517 1.414 -0.1524 -2.423 
2004 * deaths     -0.0176 -0.519 -
0.0472 
-1.277 0.1429 2.278 
2005 * deaths     -0.1901 -5.2 -
0.2264 
-5.661 0.1137 1.705 
2006 * deaths     -0.077 -2.155 -
0.2445 
-6.183 0.6332 9.896 
2007 * deaths     -0.1876 -5.13 -
0.1808 
-4.508 0.0013 0.02 
2008 * deaths     -0.2923 -7.272 -
0.3122 
-7.1 0.1195 1.6 
2009 * deaths     -0.0085 -0.223 -
0.0525 
-1.245 0.173 2.527 
2010 * deaths     0.2848 7.745 0.2555 6.298 0.1203 1.8 
2011 * deaths     0.0705 1.688 0.1117 2.438 -0.1506 -1.981 
2012 * deaths     -0.0098 -0.207 0.157 2.963 -0.491 -5.925 
Pseudo R^2 0.6583 0.6746 0.6759 
AIC 1270578 1210694 1205984 
BIC 1273471 1218088 1214503 
Notes. All models also contain distance squared, distance cubed, interactions of patient characteristics with distance, 
distance squared, distance cubed, all interacted with year. Models 2 and 3 also contain average quality of provider type 
and interactions of patient characteristics with quality, all interacted with year. 
 
5.3 Marginal utility and willingness to travel 
Unsurprisingly the marginal utility of distance is negative but less so as distance increases. Figure 4 
plots marginal utility of distance against distance (
2
1 2 32 3
d d d
t t d t dE E P E P  ) for 2004/5 and 2008/9 for 
all patients, urban patients and rural patients where Pd is the mean distance to the chosen provider 
for the relevant patient type over all years.  Figure 5 has the estimated marginal utilities of distance 
in each year for all patients, urban patients and rural patients.    
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Figure 4. Marginal utilities of distance in 2004/5 and 2008/9. 
 
Note. Marginal utility of distance is 
2
1 2 32 3
d d d
t t d t dE E P E P   where Pd is the mean distance to chosen provider for each 
patient type over all years and the coefficients on the powers of distance are for the representative patient with average 
personal characteristics. Coefficients for all patients are from model (2) and for rural and urban patients from model (3). 
Vertical lines show the average distance to the chosen provider for: all patients (solid); urban (short dashed); rural (long 
dashed). 
 
The coefficients on distance and quality measures are for the representative patient with average 
characteristics.
12
 Figure 5 plots these coefficients of the marginal utilities of distance for different 
years and shows that rural patients have a smaller marginal disutility of distance than urban patients 
and that marginal disutility did not change greatly over the period.  
 
                                                 
12
 We do not have space to show the interactions of quality and distance with patient characteristics, but we find that older 
and sicker patients have more negative marginal utility from distance, and distance has less negative marginal utility for 
more deprived patients.  Moreover, gender had little effect on preferences for quality and, more surprisingly, nor does 
morbidity.  
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Figure 5. Trends in marginal utility of distance 
 
Note. Marginal utility of distance is 
2
1 2 32 3
d d d
t t d t dE E P E P   where Pd is the mean distance to chosen provider for each 
patient type over all years and the coefficients on the powers of distance are for the representative patient with average 
personal characteristics.  Coefficients for all patients are from model (2) and for rural and urban patients from model (3). 
 
Figure 6 shows the estimated marginal rates of substitution (5) between distance and the quality 
measures (WTT). Given the temporal stability of the marginal utilities of distance, variations over 
time in WTT are mainly due to changes in the marginal utilities of quality and waiting times. The 
plotted WTT are the change (reduction) in distance required to compensate for a one standard 
deviation in increase in emergency readmission rates, revision rates, mortality rates, and waiting 
times. Since emergency readmissions either had a positive or zero marginal utility up to 2006 but 
had an increasingly negative marginal utility thereafter, the emergency readmissions rate WTT was 
initially around zero but increased from 2007/8 onwards. The mortality rate WTT grew up to 2008/9 
and then decreased.  Up to 2004/5 waiting times had a small negative marginal disutility. From 
2005/6 to 2007/8 patients became more likely to choose hospitals with longer waiting times, and 
thereafter they were less likely to choose hospitals with longer waits.  There was no consistent trend 
in the estimated marginal utilities and hence WTT for revision rates. Instead, they do not seem to 
consistently respond to one-year revision rates.  
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Figure 6. Willingness to travel (WTT) for one standard deviation increase in quality and waiting time 
 
The results suggest the effect of readmission rates, mortality, and waiting times changed after the 
relaxation of constraints on patient choice in 2006 and 2008. From 2008 patients were willing to 
travel 0.5 additional kilometres to avoid an increase of one standard deviation in emergency 
readmissions and 0.25 additional kilometres to avoid an increase of one standard deviation in 
waiting times.  
 
5.4 WTT of urban and rural patients 
The WTT for urban and rural patients are shown in Figure 7. Rural patients have a smaller marginal 
disutility from distance than urban patients. The marginal disutility for mortality is similar for urban 
and rural patients in most years up to 2011/12 except for 2006/7. Up to 2008/9 rural patients had a 
positive marginal utility for waiting time.   Urban patients dislike 1-year revisions in most years while 
this is not the case for rural patients.  Urban patients dislike emergency readmissions more than 
rural patients in most of the recent years. 
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Figure 7. Willingness to travel for a standard deviation increase in quality for urban and rural patients 
 
There are no systematic differences in the WTT for waiting times after 2008/9. There are also no 
systematic differences in WTT to avoid higher mortality except for the more recent years. In the last 
year (2012/13) rural patients are willing to travel 1 kilometre more than urban patients to avoid a 
one standard deviation increase in elective hip replacement mortality rates. Despite the higher 
disutility from travelling, urban patients are willing to travel further (up to 1 km in 2009) than rural 
ones to avoid increases in revisions after surgery. There are similar differences in all the years, 
except for 2002/3.  
 
The marginal utility for readmission rates was positive for rural patients in the pre-choice years 
before 2005. Similarly, the marginal utility for waiting times was positive for rural patients before 
2007. It is unlikely that patients prefer high emergency readmissions or long waits. We interpret 
these counterintuitive results as evidence that hospital choice was constrained, i.e. patients were 
effectively allocated to hospitals, and that rural patients were the most penalized by such 
constraints to hospital choice.  
 
5.5 HospitalƐ͛ demand elasticity to quality  
Table 3 reports the elasticity of demand with respect to own quality (6) for each year averaged 
across all hospitals. Although demand responds to quality after the introduction of choice policy, it 
was relatively inelastic. In years after 2008 the mean demand elasticity with respect to emergency 
readmissions is 0.17 and with respect to waiting time it is 0.04. Demand also responds to 
mortality rates, though less so in later years, and across the whole period the demand elasticity is 
0.03.  
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Table 3. Average hospital demand elasticities with respect to own quality by year  
Year Readmissions Mean waiting time Revisions Mortality 
2002 0.124 0.005 -0.06 -0.027 
2003 -0.037 -0.051 0.077 -0.026 
2004 0.022 -0.023 -0.067 -0.033 
2005 -0.005 0.179 -0.01 -0.06 
2006 0.044 0.295 0.002 -0.043 
2007 -0.156 0.148 0.035 -0.043 
2008 -0.066 -0.086 -0.039 -0.057 
2009 -0.082 -0.023 -0.016 -0.017 
2010 -0.254 0.005 -0.029 0.02 
2011 -0.23 -0.078 0.034 -0.005 
2012 -0.201 -0.038 0.009 -0.009 
Note. Elasticities are computed from model (2). 
 
5.6 Semi-elasticities and number of rival hospitals 
Figure 7 plots the percentage change in demand for each hospital resulting from  1 SD increases in 
readmission, mortality and revision rates, and waiting times (semi-elasticity (7)) against the number 
of competing hospitals within 30 km radius of each provider. It shows the extent to which hospitals 
facing more competitors have a more elastic demand. We compare two years, 2004/5 and 2008/09, 
before and after relaxation of constraints on choice.  
 
Figure 8(a) shows that in 2004/5 semi-elasticities with respect to emergency readmissions were 
positive (on average equal to 0.8%). The correlation between semi-elasticity of demand and number 
of rival hospitals was positive and significant (at 5%). In contrast, in 2008/9 the semi-elasticities with 
respect to emergency readmissions were negative (on average equal to -2.5%, varying between         
-0.35% and -4.8%) and negatively correlated with the number of rival hospitals. This suggests that 
after the introduction of choice, hospital demand responded to quality and the percentage demand 
change was larger for hospitals facing more potential competitors. The effect of additional rivals 
seems modest. In 2008/9, a hospital with 5 rivals had a predicted semi-elasticity of 2%, whereas a 
hospital with twice as many rivals (10 rivals) has a predicted semi-elasticity of 2.44%.  
 
Figure 8(b) shows in 2004/5 semi-elasticities with respect to waiting times are negative but small (on 
average -0.87%). In 2008/9, the semi-elasticities with respect to waiting times are greater absolutely 
(on average equal to -6%, and varying between -0.84% and -11.4%), and negatively correlated with 
the number of rivals hospitals. In 2008/9 one additional rival increases absolutely the semi-elasticity 
of demand by almost a fifth.  
 
The patterns of semi-elasticities with respect to mortality in Figure 8(d) are qualitatively similar to 
those for waiting times. In 2004/5 they are negative but small. In 2008/9, the semi-elasticities with 
respect to mortality vary between -1.18% and -16% and additional rivals lead to a bigger change in 
the semi-elasticity. The semi-elasticities with respect to revisions are negatively associated with the 
number of rivals (Figure 8(c)) but with a similar pattern in 2004/5 and 2008/9 (Full results are 
presented in Table A1 in the Appendix). 
 
Location, quality and choice of hospital: evidence from England 2002/3-2012/13  19 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Percentage demand change from a standard deviation increase in own quality and number of rivals
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6. Conclusions 
We have investigated changes in the responsiveness of demand to quality following the introduction 
of the new internal market from 2002/3 onwards and in particular the relaxation of constraints on 
patient choice from 2006 onwards. Consistently with previous literature we find that distance is the 
main predictor of hospital choice. Before 2006 demand was sometimes higher for providers with 
worse quality or longer waiting times  W a finding we interpret as suggesting that patient choices 
were indeed constrained. After 2006 these patterns disappear and we find that patients preferred, 
on average, providers with lower waiting times, emergency readmissions rates, and mortality rates. 
 
Although hospitals with higher quality, ceteris paribus, attract more patients, the estimated demand 
elasticities are generally 0.2 or less. With an average NHS tariff for hip replacement in 2012/13 of 
£5866 this implies that, for example, a reduction in the emergency readmission rate of one standard 
deviation would increase the number of hip replacement patients in an average provider by 24.4, 
yielding a revenue increase £143,000.  However, additional patients impose additional costs and 
increasing quality by one standard deviation will also be costly. 
 
Hospital demand is more responsive to quality for providers facing more rivals. Although the result is 
intuitive, the increase in responsiveness seems quite small. For example in 2012/13, hospitals with 
ten additional rivals have demand semi-elasticity with respect to readmission rates by which are 
more negative by -1.2%.  
 
Compared with urban patients, rural patients do not seem to have very different preferences with 
respect to quality, except for revision rates (and readmission rates in recent years), which are 
generally found to be disliked more by urban than by rural patients.  In contrast, rural patients are 
less averse to distances and travel further to their chosen provider.  Although marginal disutility 
from travel is lower, the total disutility of travel is higher for rural patients.  There seems to be scope 
for choice policies to be further refined and to stimulate patients to choose providers based on 
quality.  Surveys of patients suggest that only around 2/3
rd
 are aware of their right to a choice and 
that around 50% report being offered a choice (Dixon, 2010). There may be required policies which 
encourage further dissemination and use of information on quality.  Other possibilities include 
subsidising travel expenses for patients bypassing local hospitals, as in Norway (Askildsen et al, 
2013). The cost of interventions aimed at further stimulating competition need however to be 
traded-off with the opportunity cost of introducing alternative policies aimed at improving quality, 
such as monitoring and auditing, and pay-for-performance schemes.  
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Appendix A  
Table A1. Linear regression of hospital semi-elasticities estimates (from Eq. 7) on number of rival hospitals 
within 30km. 
Quality measure Year OLS Coefficient 95% C.I. Bounds 
Readmissions 2002 0.2394 [0.2209, 0.2578] 
Readmissions 2003 -0.0609 [-0.0657, -0.0560] 
Readmissions 2004 0.0338 [0.0302, 0.0373] 
Readmissions 2005 -0.0075 [-0.0083, -0.0067] 
Readmissions 2006 0.0625 [0.0569, 0.0681] 
Readmissions 2007 -0.1883 [-0.2057, -0.1709] 
Readmissions 2008 -0.0869 [-0.0936, -0.0802] 
Readmissions 2009 -0.0864 [-0.0962, -0.0765] 
Readmissions 2010 -0.2087 [-0.2335, -0.1838] 
Readmissions 2011 -0.1424 [-0.1658, -0.1190] 
Readmissions 2012 -0.1228 [-0.1461, -0.0995] 
Waiting Times 2002 0.0075 [0.0069, 0.0081] 
Waiting Times 2003 -0.0687 [-0.0742, -0.0632] 
Waiting Times 2004 -0.0349 [-0.0386, -0.0313] 
Waiting Times 2005 0.3083 [0.2755, 0.3411] 
Waiting Times 2006 0.5947 [0.5415, 0.6479] 
Waiting Times 2007 0.2934 [0.2663, 0.3205] 
Waiting Times 2008 -0.2072 [-0.2231, -0.1912] 
Waiting Times 2009 -0.0601 [-0.0670, -0.0533] 
Waiting Times 2010 0.0107 [0.0094, 0.0120] 
Waiting Times 2011 -0.1174 [-0.1368, -0.0981] 
Waiting Times 2012 -0.0540 [-0.0642, -0.0437] 
Revisions 2002 -0.1705 [-0.1837, -0.1573] 
Revisions 2003 0.1896 [0.1745, 0.2047] 
Revisions 2004 -0.1295 [-0.1432, -0.1159] 
Revisions 2005 -0.0207 [-0.0229, -0.0185] 
Revisions 2006 0.0046 [0.0042, 0.0051] 
Revisions 2007 0.0844 [0.0766, 0.0922] 
Revisions 2008 -0.1069 [-0.1152, -0.0987] 
Revisions 2009 -0.0397 [-0.0443, -0.0352] 
Revisions 2010 -0.0667 [-0.0747, -0.0588] 
Revisions 2011 0.0543 [0.0453, 0.0632] 
Revisions 2012 0.0156 [0.0127, 0.0186] 
Mortality 2002 -0.1041 [-0.1121, -0.0960] 
Mortality 2003 -0.0878 [-0.0948, -0.0808] 
Mortality 2004 -0.1085 [-0.1199, -0.0971] 
Mortality 2005 -0.2293 [-0.2537, -0.2049] 
Mortality 2006 -0.1553 [-0.1692, -0.1414] 
Mortality 2007 -0.2146 [-0.2345, -0.1948] 
Mortality 2008 -0.2914 [-0.3138, -0.2689] 
Mortality 2009 -0.0773 [-0.0861, -0.0685] 
Mortality 2010 0.0690 [0.0608, 0.0772] 
Mortality 2011 -0.0214 [-0.0250, -0.0179] 
Mortality 2012 -0.0506 [-0.0602, -0.0410] 
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Figure A1. Marginal utilities of quality, waiting time and distance 
 
Figure A2. Marginal utilities of quality, waiting time and distance for urban and rural patients 
